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Abstract
As computational power has continued to increase, and sensors have become more accurate, the
corresponding advent of systems that are at once cognitive and immersive has arrived. These cog-
nitive and immersive systems (CAISs) fall squarely into the intersection of AI with HCI/HRI: such
systems interact with and assist the human agents that enter them, in no small part because such
systems are infused with AI able to understand and reason about these humans and their knowl-
edge, beliefs, goals, communications, plans, etc. We herein explain our approach to engineering
CAISs. We emphasize the capacity of a CAIS to develop and reason over a “theory of the mind”
of its human partners. This capacity entails that the AI in question has a sophisticated model of
the beliefs, knowledge, goals, desires, emotions, etc. of these humans. To accomplish this engi-
neering, a formal framework of very high expressivity is needed. In our case, this framework is a
cognitive event calculus, a particular kind of quantified multi-operator modal logic, and a matching
high-expressivity automated reasoner and planner. To explain, advance, and to a degree validate
our approach, we show that a calculus of this type satisfies a set of formal requirements, and can en-
able a CAIS to understand a psychologically tricky scenario couched in what we call the cognitive
polysolid framework (CPF). We also formally show that a room that satisfies these requirements
can have a useful property we term expectation of usefulness. CPF, a sub-class of cognitive mi-
croworlds, includes machinery able to represent and plan over not merely blocks and actions (such
as seen in the primitive “blocks worlds” of old), but also over agents and their mental attitudes
about both other agents and inanimate objects.
c© 20XX Cognitive Systems Foundation. All rights reserved.
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Figure 1: The flow of information through the areas of a CAIS.
1. Introduction
In contemporary AI research devoted to decision support, the challenge is often taken to be that of
providing AI support to a single human. However, much human problem-solving is fundamentally
social, in that a group of people must work together to solve a problem, and must rely upon machine
intelligence that is itself highly diverse. Examples of such activities include: hiring a person into
a university or company, tackling an emergency crisis like a water pipeline break, planning an
intricate medical operation, deciding on companies for merging or acquisition, etc. Motivated by
such challenges, we are interested in how an artificial agent — embedded in a social-collaboration
environment like an immersive room — can, on the spot, help a group of human participants.
We first introduce the notion of a cognitive and immersive system (CAIS), which is comprised of
three sub-areas linked to each other in a cyclical flow, shown in Figure 1. The first area is responsible
for perception and sensing within the environment housing the human agents (specifically for us,
within the room). Percepts come courtesy of a range of sensors; for example, microphones and
kinects. The second area covers interpreting, understanding, and acting upon perceived data through
reasoning, planning, learning, and NLP. The third area is devoted to displaying both percepts, and
the results of processing thereof, in rich multi-modal ways. The particular CAIS we have so far used
for our investigations additionally has access to a variety of external machines and services that can
be called upon to process requests, queries, and tasks, and to incorporate the results of analysis
of additional information from these ines into further decision-making. An important part of our
particular CAIS is that there are some number of overseeing AIs (agents) operating at the system
level that can make use of any part of the CAIS to assist and aid the humans and other AIs that are
operating within the room. Thus this architecture is neither fully centralized, nor fully distributed,
but aims to combine the strengths of both.
As an initial test of our CAIS implementation, we examine two scenarios wherein participants
have an imbalance of knowledge/beliefs that might influence their actions. It is common in group
discussions that not all participants are aware of everything said in the discussion, whether because
2
TOWARD COGNITIVE AND IMMERSIVE SYSTEMS
they missed something being said or misconstrue something. However, they may still try to act
on their beliefs that do not (or no longer) properly reflect reality, or may know of their ignorance
and wish to remedy it. A CAIS should be able to offer help to participants in these cases, either
by alerting participants if they are acting on beliefs that are no longer relevant, or by giving a
brief summary of the things that had happened while they were out of the discussion. To do this,
a CAIS must be able to model the theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Frith & Frith,
2005; Arkoudas & Bringsjord, 2009a) of the participants and track its state through time. On the
basis of its understanding of this modeling, a CAIS must be able to step in as necessary to offer
corrective advice, along with a justification for it. Most importantly, the particular capacities we
have just enumerated as desiderata for a CAIS must flow from underlying formal requirements that
rigorously capture the general desiderata in question.
To accomplish the above tasks, we first present informal requirements that differentiate a CAIS
from other intelligent agents. The requirements are in terms of the cognitive states and common
knowledge of the agents within a CAIS. As far as we know, this is the first such characterization of
what separates an intelligent room from an intelligent agent. We then cast the informal requirements
in a formal logic and show that these requirements lead to a useful property (Property 1). We then
briefly present a framework for a domain of problems that can be used to test a CAIS. From there,
we define two tasks with that framework, and then show that by Property 1, the system (with
the relevant information) can solve the tasks. Finally, after a sustained discussion of related, prior
research in AI in which we make clear the unique power of our formalisms and technology, we
discuss promising future lines of work.
1.1 Cognitive Immersive Room
In development of a CAIS, much work has gone into the creation of a cognitive immersive room
architecture (Divekar et al., 2018) which allows for research into augmenting human group collab-
oration and decision-making with cognitive artificial agents. To start, we build on the prior work in
the space of intelligent rooms, primarily that carried out in Brooks (1997).
At the core of our room, we have an array of microphones that hear what people say, which
utilizes a transcription service to translate the speech to text. Given the text, we then check for the
presence of a “trigger word” to indicate if a user is talking to the room or not. If the “trigger word” is
detected, the text is then further analyzed (utilizing the IBM Watson Assistant1) to extract an intent
for the text as well as any keywords in the text given the command. The intent and keywords are then
fed into the executor which in turn drives the room, and can call external services as necessary and
output content to users via connected displays or speakers. Additionally, the executor maintains the
state of the room as well as definition of the conversation tree that is available to the participants at
any given time. Each of these components are implemented and run separately and communication
between them is handled via passing JSON objects using the message queue server RabbitMQ2.
In addition to these, there is a host of external web services made available to any component
through the standard GET/POST HTTP request headers. An example of such a web service is
the “name-resolver-general,” which, given a name, will return a list of probable matches for that
1. https://www.ibm.com/watson/services/conversation/
2. https://www.rabbitmq.com
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keyword, which allows us to handle misspellings introduced in the keyword by the speech-to-text
translation. Each of these external web services are registered in our “service-registry,” which the
executor references using its name to get the IP and port of these services to be able to call them.
The registry also acts as a monitor for each service to determine if the service is available or not.
Finally, we utilize the in-memory data store of Redis3 to store information about our agents during a
particular usage or session of the room and then use the PostgreSQL4 database to store information
on a longer-term basis. The displays for the room are three projectors on which we run Electron5,
which allows for building desktop GUIs powered by web technologies, including HTML, CSS,
and JS. In Electron, the executor can open various web pages and sites within the GUI, showing
both internal (such as transcript or command log) and external content (such as Google maps or
Youtube).
1.2 Recognition of the Need for Theory-of-Mind-Level AI
Independent of the specific formalisms and corresponding technology that we soon bring to bear
herein, we first point out that the need to model the mental states of humans in order to engineer
certain AI systems that understand and interact well with these humans has been recognized. For
example, work in human-robot teaming has focused on the use of automated planning techniques
that take human goals and (mental) states into account. In addition, work on human-aware task
planning for mobile robots (Cirillo et al., 2009) has used predicted plans for the humans to guide the
automated system’s own planning. This direction was made more explicit in work on coo¨rdinating
the goals and plans of humans and robots (Talamadupula et al., 2014; Chakraborti et al., 2015); here,
a subset of the humans’ mental states relevant to the autonomous system’s planning problems was
explicitly represented and reasoned with. Very recent work has focused on adapting these previous
ideas and techniques to proactive decision-making (Sengupta et al., 2017; Kim & Shah, 2017) and
smart-room environments (Chakraborti et al., 2017). Pearce et al. (2014) note the importance of
what they dub “social planning,” which includes an agent’s seeking a goal via the modification of
the mental states of others. For a final example, in (Langley et al., 2016), PUG, a system that uses
mental simulation to plan for symbolic goals that have numeric utilities, is presented.6
On the other hand, while these papers confirm the recognition to which we refer, and while
they feature some level of formalization of human-level mental states, they seem to us to lack the
necessary technical formal and computational machinery needed to mechanize a full human-level
theory of mind — let alone such a theory of mind and the requirements of a truly smart room/CAIS
we set below.7 We now turn to the presentation of the requisite formal and computational machinery.
3. https://redis.io
4. https://www.postgresql.org
5. https://electronjs.org
6. Our latter two examples here are briefly returned to later in “Prior/Related Work and Novelty.”
7. Note that in the present paper there is a limit to the theory-of-mind-modeling “power” we insist an overseeing AI
have. E.g., we don’t require that an AI overseeing an environment populated with humans have so-called phenome-
nal consciousness, a form of “what’s it’s like to” consciousness characterized e.g. by Block (1995), and claimed by
Bringsjord (2007) to be impossible for a mere machine to possess. In sharp contrast with phenomenal consciousness,
cognitive consciousness consists only in the logico-mathematical structure of human-level (and, indeed, above) cog-
nition, instantiated through time. While cognitive consciousness can be characterized axiomatically with help from
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2. The Deontic Cognitive Event Calculus
To capture the room in a formal way, we employ the deontic cognitive event calculus (DCEC).8
While the full syntax and inference schemata are outside the scope of this paper, we give a brief
overview.9 DCEC is a multi-sorted quantified modal logic with a well-defined syntax and proof cal-
culus. DCEC subsumes the event calculus (Mueller, 2014), a first-order calculus used for modeling
events and actions and their effects upon the world. The proof calculus of DCEC is based on natu-
ral deduction (Gentzen, 1964) and includes all the introduction and elimination rules for first-order
logic, as well as inference schemata for the modal operators and related structures. DCEC is a sorted
system and includes the following built-in sorts:
Sort Description
Agent Human and non-human actors.
Time Time points. E.g., ti, birthday(son(jack)) etc.
Event Used for events in the domain.
ActionType Abstract actions instantiated by agents.
Action Events that occur as actions by agents
Fluent Representing states of the world.
The intensional operators and necessary inference schemata for this paper are shown below
below. The operator B(a, t, φ) represents that agent a at time t believes φ. The operatorK(a, t, φ)
represents that agent a at time t knows φ.10 The operatorD(a, t, φ) represents that agent a at time t
desired φ. The operator C(t, φ) represents that at time t, φ is common knowledge, which from the
inference schemata defined below we see means subsequently that all agents know φ. The operator
S(a, b, t, φ) represents that agent a told agent b φ at time t. Alternatively, it can be used as S(a, t, φ),
which represents that agent a at time t said φ (and everyone hears it). We also have the operator
P(a, t, φ), which represents that agent a at time t perceived φ (giving us also that agent a knows φ
at time t).
For our current purposes, the main inference schemata needed include IK and IB, which state
that knowledge and belief are closed under the inference system of DCEC. We also have infer-
ence schemata that let us go from perception to knowledge (I1), knowledge to belief (I2), common
knowledge to knowledge (I3), and from knowledge to propositions that hold (I4). Later below,
we also use derived inference schemata for converting perceptions to knowledge, knowledge to
belief, common knowledge to belief etc., labeled as D[P K], D[K B], and D[C B] respectively
(Arkoudas & Bringsjord, 2008).
the formal languages we introduce below for cognitive calculi (Bringsjord et al., 2018), in the present paper we do
not require the AI overseeing CAISs to have even cognitive consciousness, and we specifically do not require, at this
early point in our work on CAISs, cognitive self -consciousness, despite the fact that the latter is something that has
been significantly mechanized and implemented Bringsjord et al. (2015); Bringsjord (2010).
8. We do not use the deontic components in DCEC in this paper.
9. For a more in-depth primer on the DCEC, see the appendix in Govindarajulu & Bringsjord (2017a).
10. Note that knowing is not decomposable or inferable from belief.
5
M. PEVELER, N. S. GOVINDARAJULU, S. BRINGSJORD, A. SEN, B. SRIVASTAVA, & K. TALAMADUPULA,
Syntax
S ::=
Object | Agent | Self @ Agent | ActionType
Action v Event | Moment | Formula | Fluent | Numeric
f ::=
action : Agent× ActionType→ Action
initially : Fluent→ Formula
holds : Fluent×Moment→ Formula
happens : Event×Moment→ Formula
clipped : Moment× Fluent×Moment→ Formula
initiates : Event× Fluent×Moment→ Formula
terminates : Event× Fluent×Moment→ Formula
prior : Moment×Moment→ Formula
t ::= x : S | c : S | f(t1, . . . , tn)
φ ::=
t : Formula | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ |
P(a, t, φ) |K(a, t, φ) |C(t, φ) | S(a, b, t, φ) |
S(a, t, φ) |B(a, t, φ) |D(a, t, holds(f, t′)) | I(a, t, φ)
Inference Schemata (fragment)
K(a, t1,Γ), Γ ` φ, t1 ≤ t2
K(a, t2, φ)
[IK]
B(a, t1,Γ), Γ ` φ, t1 ≤ t2
B(a, t2, φ)
[IB]
C(t,P(a, t, φ)→ K(a, t, φ)) [I1]
C(t,K(a, t, φ)→ B(a, t, φ)) [I2]
C(t, φ) t ≤ t1 . . . t ≤ tn
K(a1, t1, . . .K(an, tn, φ) . . .)
[I3]
K(a, t, φ)
φ
[I4]
...
...
2.1 Non-modal Systems are not Enough
Note that first-order logic is an extensional system; modal logics are intensional systems. DCEC
is intensional in the sense that it has intensional operators.11 Formal systems that are intensional
are crucial for modeling theory-of-mind reasoning. One simple reason is that using first-order logic
leads to unsound inferences as shown below, in which we have an agent r that knows the manager of
a team is the most responsible person in the team. Agent r does not know that Moe is the manager
of the team, but it’s true that Moe is the manager. If the knowledge operatorK is a simple first-order
predicate, we get the proof shown below, which produces a contradiction (that r knows that Moe is
the manager) from true premises. This unsoundness persists even with more robust representation
schemes in extensional logics (Bringsjord & Govindarajulu, 2012).
1 K (r, Manager (team,mostResponsible (team))) ; given
2 ¬K (r,Manager (team,Moe)) ; given
3 Moe = mostResponsible (team) ; given
4 K (r,Manager (team,Moe)) ; first-order inference from 3 and 1
5 ⊥ ; first-order inference from 4 and 2
2.2 Reasoner (Theorem Prover)
To handle reasoning within DCEC we utilize a quantified modal logic theorem prover, Shadow-
Prover.12 The prover works by utilizing a technique called shadowing to achieve speed without
11. Please note that there is a vast difference between intension and intention.
12. The prover is available in both Java and Common Lisp and can be obtained at: https://github.com/
naveensundarg/prover. The underlying first-order prover is SNARK, available at: http://www.ai.sri.
com/˜stickel/snark.html.
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sacrificing consistency in the system. Describing the details of the reasoner are beyond the scope
here. See (Govindarajulu & Bringsjord, 2017a,b) for more details.
2.3 Planner
Planning for the room is handled by Spectra, a planner based on an extension of STRIPS-style
planning.13 In this planning formalism, arbitrary formulae of DCEC are allowed in states, actions,
and goals. For instance, valid states and goals can include: “No three blocks on the table should be
of the same color.” and “Jack believes that Jill believes there is one block on the table.”
3. What is a CAIS? Informal Requirements
Note that a CAIS can be considered an intelligent room that specifically requires intelligence of
a cognitive sort; that is, it is not sufficient that the room be intelligent about, for example, search
queries over a domain D; the room should also be intelligent about cognitive states of agents in the
room and their cognitive states and attitudes toward D.
Despite there being a significant amount of work done in building intelligent environments
(of varying levels of intelligence; Coen et al., 1998; Brooks, 1997; Chan et al., 2008), there is no
formalization of what constitutes an intelligent room and what separates it from an intelligent agent.
Though (Coen et al., 1998) briefly differentiates an intelligent room from ubiquitous computing
based on the non-ubiquity of sensors in the former, there is not any formal or rigorous discussion of
what separates an intelligent room from a mobile robot that roams around the room with an array of
sensors. We offer below a sketch of informal requirements that an immersive room should aim for.
Then we instantiate these requirements using DCEC.
The requirements in question are cognitive in nature and exceed intelligent rooms with sensors
that can answer queries over simple extensional data (e.g. a room that can answer financial queries
such as “Show me the number of companies with revenue over X?”). At a high-level, we require
that the two conditions below hold:
Informal Requirements
C Cognitive A CAIS system should be able to help agents with cognitive tasks and goals. For instance, a system
that simply aids in querying a domainD is not cognitive in nature; a system that aids an agent in convincing
another agent that some state-of-affairs holds in D is considered cognitive.
I Immersive/Non-localized There should be some attribute or property of a CAIS that is non-localized and dis-
tinguished from agents in the room. Moreover, this property should be common knowledge. (Note: this is
not easily achievable with a physical robot, and this condition differentiates a CAIS system from a cognitive
agent.)a
a. This condition may not strictly be realizable, but the goal is to at a minimum build systems that approach this
ideal condition.
13. “STRIPS-style” ascribed to a planner P means that some of the prominent properties that a STRIPS planner has, P
has. For illustration by analogy, a theorem prover in the style of some famous first-order one (e.g. Otter) could be
capable of reasoning with second-order formulae. A programming language in the logic-programming style could
actually fail to be based on first-order logic or a fragment thereof. It is important to note that Spectra’s planning is
based on an extension of STRIPS-style planning.
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4. Formal Requirements for a CAIS
Now we translate the informal requirements presented above for a CAIS γ. The CAIS we present
acts as an arbiter when goals of agents conflict, and acts to rectify false or missing beliefs. Assume
that enclosed within γ’s space at time t are agentsA(t) = {a1, . . . , an}. (Note: γ is also an agent but
is not included in A(t).) Time is assumed to be discrete, as in the discrete event calculus presented
in Mueller (2014). There is a background set of axioms and propositions Γ(t) that is operational at
time t. We have a fluent vicinity that tells us whether an agent is in the vicinity of a fluent, event,
or another agent. Only events and fluents in the vicinity of an agent can be observed by the agent.
vicinity : Agent× Fluent ∪ Event ∪ Agent→ Fluent
For the cognitive condition C above, we have the following concrete requirements that we imple-
ment in our system. Later, we give examples of these requirements in action.
Formal Requirements for C
Assume Γ ` t < t+ ∆
Cf1 : It is common knowledge that, if an agent x has a false belief, γ informs the agent of the belief:
a
C
t,
B(γ, t, φ) ∧B(γ, t,B
(
x, t,¬φ))
→
S(γ, x, t+ ∆, φ)


Cf2 : It is common knowledge that, if an agent x has a missing belief, γ informs the agent of the belief:
C
t,
B(γ, t, φ) ∧B(γ, t,¬B
(
x, t, φ)
)
→
S(γ, x, t+ ∆, φ)


a. Please note that inference inDCEC is non-monotonic as it includes the event calculus, which is non-monotonic.
If an agent a believes φ based on prior information, adding new information can cause the agent to not believe
φ.
For the immersive condition I above, we have the following conditions:
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Formal Requirements for I
If1 : It is common knowledge that at any point in time t an agent x, different from the CAIS system γ, can
observe events or conditions (fluents) only in its vicinity.
C
(
∀x, t, f :(x 6= γ)→
[
P
(
x, t, holds(f, t)
)→ holds(vicinity(x, f), t)])
C
(
∀x, t, e :(x 6= γ)→
[
P
(
x, t, happens(e, t)
)→ holds(vicinity(x, e), t)])
If2 : It is common knowledge that actions performed by the agent are in its vicinity.
C
(
∀x, α : holds(vicinity(x, action(a, α)), t))
If3 : It is common knowledge that all events and fluents are perceived by γ. This is represented by the four
conditions below:
(i) C
(
∀t, f :
[
holds(f, t)↔ P(γ, t, holds(f, t))])
(ii) C
(
∀t, e :
[
happens(e, t)↔ P(γ, t, happens(e, t))])
(iii) C
(
∀t, f :
[
¬holds(f, t)↔ P(γ, t,¬holds(f, t))])
(iv) C
(
∀t, e :
[
¬happens(e, t)↔ P(γ, t,¬happens(e, t))])
5. A Foundational Property of CAIS
One of the benefits of having a properly designed CAIS is that humans inside it can rely upon the
CAIS to help other agents with relevant missing or false information φ, as opposed to the case with
a mobile robot. If we had a localized mobile robot instead of a CAIS, the human would need to
decide whether the robot has the required information φ and needs to believe that the robot believes
that the other human is missing the relevant information φ. If a CAIS system satisfies the above
condition, we can derive the following foundationally important (object-level in DCEC) property
that states this in a formal manner.
Property 1: Expectation of Usefulness
If the above properties hold, then an agent a that perceives that another agent b is not aware of an event
happening, believes that CAIS γ will inform b (Assume: Γ ` t < t+ ∆):
P
(
a, t, happens
(
e, t
)) ∧P(a, t,¬holds(vicinity(b, e), t))
→
B
(
a, t,S
(
γ, b, t+ ∆, happens(e, t)
))
9
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Proof Sketch: Colors used for readability.
P(a, t, happens(e, t))
D[P K]
K(a, t, happens(e, t))
D[K B]
B(a, t, happens(e, t)) ≡ φ1
P(a, t,¬holds(vicinity(b, e), t))
D[P K]
K
(
a, t,¬holds(vicinity(b, e), t))
D[K B]
B
(
a, t,¬holds(vicinity(b, e), t)) ≡ φ2
Using If3(ii) the CAIS observes all events that happen in its enclosure:
If3 (ii) ≡ C
(
∀t, e :
[
happens(e, t)↔ P(γ, t, happens(e, t))])
D[C B]
B
(
a, t, ∀t, e :
[
happens(e, t)↔ P(γ, t, happens(f, t))]) φ1
IB
B
(
a, t,P
(
γ, t, happens(e, t)
))
IB
B
(
a, t,B
(
γ, t, happens(e, t)
)) ≡ ψ1
Similarly, using If3(iii):
If3 (iii) ≡ C
(
∀t, e :
[
¬holds(e, t)↔ P(γ, t,¬holds(e, t))])
D[C B]
B
(
a, t, ∀t, e
[
¬holds(e, t)↔ P(γ, t,¬holds(e, t))]) φ2
IB
B(a, t,P(γ, t,¬holds(vicinity(b, e), t)))
IB
B(a, t,B
(
γ, t,¬holds(vicinity(b, e), t)) ≡ φ3
From If1 (and from B
(
a, t,B(γ, t, b 6= γ))):
C
(
∀x, t, e : (x 6= γ)→ [P(x, t, happens(e, t))→ holds(vicinity(x, e), t)])
D[C B]
B
(
a, t,B
(
γ, t, ∀x, t, e : (x 6= γ)→ [P(x, t, happens(e, t))→ holds(vicinity(x, e), t)]))
IB
B
(
a, t,B
(
γ, t
[
¬holds(vicinity(b, e), t)→ ¬P(b, t, happens(e, t))])) φ3
IB
B
(
a, t,B
(
γ, t,¬P(b, t, happens(e, t))))
IB
B
(
a, t,B(γ, t,¬B(b, t, happens(e, t)))) ≡ ψ2
From Cf2 , we have:
C
(
t,
[
B(γ, t, happens(e, t)) ∧B(γ, t,¬B(b, t, happens(e, t)))→ S(γ, b, t+ ∆, happens(e, t))])
D[C B]
B
(
a, t,
[
B(γ, t, happens(e, t)) ∧B(γ, t,¬B(b, t, happens(e, t)))→ S(γ, b, t+ ∆, happens(e, t))] ) ≡ ψ
Using the above derived, ψ and using IB:
ψ B
(
a, t,B
(
γ, t, happens(e, t)
)) ≡ ψ1 B(a, t,B(γ, t,¬B(b, t, happens(e, t)))) ≡ ψ2
IB
B(a, t,S(γ, b, t+ ∆, happens(e, t)))

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6. Cognitive Polysolid Framework
We now introduce the cognitive polysolid famework (CPF), a class of problems that we use for
experiments. From the framework, we can generate specific cognitive polysolid world instantiations
in which we then declare the number of blocks/solids, their properties, and how these blocks/solids
can be moved, as well as any agents and their possible beliefs or knowledge.
The CPF subsumes the familiar “blocks world,” described for instance in Nilsson (1980), and
long used for reasoning and planning in purely extensional ways. Briefly, CPF gives us a physi-
cal and cognitive domain unlike the purely physical blocks world domain. (The formal logic used
in Nilsson (1980) is purely extensional, as it’s simply first-order logic.) Since the physical com-
plexities of blocks world problems have been well explored (Gupta & Nau, 1991), and since this
microworld has been has been used for benchmarking (Slaney & Thibaux, 2001), we emphasize
cognitive extensions of it.
A cognitive polysolid world instantiation contains some finite number of blocks and a table large
enough to hold all of them. Each block is on one other object; that object can be another block or
the table. A block is said to be clear if there is no block that is on top of it. To move the blocks, an
agent can either stack (placing a block on the table on top of another block) or unstack (taking
a block that is on top of another block and placing it on the table). Before stacking the blocks,
both need to be clear; when unstacking, the top block must be clear beforehand. After stacking
the blocks, the bottom block is then not clear, and after unstacking, it is then clear. Translating this
description to theDCEC, we add two additional sorts and a constant, as well as some new functions;
our augmentation is shown below:
Surface @ Object
Block @ Surface
table : Surface
on : Block× Surface→ Fluent
clear : Block→ Fluent
goal : Formula× Number→ Formula
stack : Block× Block→ ActionType
unstack : Block× Block→ ActionType
7. A Cognitive Polysolid World Simulation
We start with a very elementary cognitive polysolid world (though this work scales fine to larger
numbers). We have three identical blocks, named A, B, and C, which all start on the table. This is
represented in the DCEC as:
holds(on(A, table), 0) holds(clear (A), 0)
holds(on(B, table), 0) holds(clear (B), 0)
holds(on(C, table), 0) holds(clear (C), 0)
There are only two human agents, h1 and h2, who have knowledge about how the cognitive
polysolid world works. Using this instantiation, we give the room two tasks to demonstrate its
theory of mind as required by the constraints specified above. For both tasks, we will use the
following sequence of events to configure the world for the two tasks:
1. h1 and h2 enter the room
2. h1 moves block A onto block B
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h1’s goals and beliefs
goals: On(A,C)
belief:
CBA
h2’s goals and beliefs
goals: On(C,B)
belief:
B
A
C
Figure 2: Visual representation of mental states of the agents (h2’s state is grayed as he is not in the
room).
3. h2 adds the goal of block C on block B
4. h2 leaves the room
5. h1 moves block A to the table
6. h1 removes the goal for block C and adds the goal of block A on block C
7. h1 moves block A onto block C
8. h2 returns to the room
9. h2 tries to move A to the table.
For this simulation, all events and fluents inside the room are considered to be in the vicinity of
agents within the room, and none of the events and fluents within the room are considered to be in
the vicinity of agents outside the room when they happen or hold.
For the first portion of this task, we consider the world between steps 5 & 6. At this point, we
wish to see where the room believes the blocks are, as well as where it believes that h1 and h2 think
the blocks are, focusing primarily on block A. We ask the machine three questions, translating them
into the DCEC: “Where does the CAIS/h1/h2 believe block A is?”. We translate this question into
three sentences in the DCEC which we can then pass down to ShadowProver to answer. For the
first two questions, both the AI and the agent h1 are in the room and can perceive where the block
is, and thus have knowledge of its location. h2 left the room at step 4 and missed the block being
moved at step 5. Therefore, his knowledge of where the block is remains at what it was when he
was in the room. We show the three statements below generated from ShadowProver that answers
the above questions as well as show a visual representation of this answer in Figure 2:
B(cais, t, holds(on(A, table), t))
B(h1, t, holds(on(A, table), t))
B(h2, t, holds(on(A,B), t))
For the second part of the task, we consider how the room responds after step 9 (say at t10).
The room believes that agent h2 still believes that the goal is On(C,B), and that it differs from the
current goal of On(A,C). The room then notifies h2 showing a side-by-side comparison of the
current goals of the room (and the plan to achieve it) and what his believed goals with respect to the
12
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room are (and the plan to achieve them). The system is able to do this, allowing for lag due to net-
work calls, on average in around 748ms employing ShadowProver and Spectra multiple times.14
Note that this scenario is an instantation of Property 1 (Expectation of Usefulness) proved above.
Property 1 is instantiated with the event e being setting a new goal: e ≡ setGoal(On(A,C)):
P
(
h1, t6, happens
(
setGoal(On(A,C)), t6
)) ∧P(h1, t6,¬holds(vicinity(h2, setGoal(On(A,C))), t6))
→ B
(
h1, t9,S
(
γ, h2, t10happens(setGoal(On(A,C)), t6)
))
8. A Quick Summary
We give a quick summary before we delve into comparisons with prior/related work below.
(1) In Section 2.1 we explained why systems that are less expressive than quantified modal logic
cannot model beliefs and other mental states with fidelity.
(2) We proposed in Section 3 a pair of informal requirements 〈C, I〉 that a CAIS should satisfy.
(3) In Section 4, we formalized these requirements inDCEC, a quantified modal logic, resulting in:
〈Cf1 ,Cf2 , If1 , If2 , If3〉
(4) We then proved in Section 5 that these formal requirements lead to a desirable property: Prop-
erty 1 (a foundational property that can be used to build other such properties in future work).
(5) Finally, we briefly presented an implementation of a system that adheres to the formalization.
We showed a scenario in a cognitive polysolid world where Property 1 is useful and realized.
9. Prior/Related Work and Novelty
9.1 Microworlds
The environment for our case studies is, as we have said, not a blocks world. Blocks worlds are
all deficient from the point of view of our research program, in significant part because the ob-
jects within them are devoid of propositional attitudes, and hence mere extensional logic suffices.
A classic confirmatory presentation and lucid discussion of a classic blocks world can be found
in Genesereth & Nilsson (1987); it will be seen in that discussion that the only objects in the mi-
croworld are inanimate and non-cognitive. The same will be seen in early, seminal attempts to
formalize physical objects and processes, as for instance in Hayes (1978, 1985). In stark contrast,
CPF is a member of a class of microworlds best lableled as cognitive microworlds; a sine qua non
for a microworld being in this class is that some of the objects therein are cognitive agents that as
14. The algorithmic details of the implementation are irrelevant and can be found in prior cited work. There is a deeper
integration with the reasoner and planner that allows us to offload intensive reasoning tasks, necessitated by the
principles given above, as planning tasks. Discussing this is beyond the scope of this paper. A video of this task can
be viewed at http://mpeveler.com/cbwf-falsebelief.html
13
M. PEVELER, N. S. GOVINDARAJULU, S. BRINGSJORD, A. SEN, B. SRIVASTAVA, & K. TALAMADUPULA,
such have propositional attitudes and obligations, and attend, perceive, communicate at the level
of human natural language, etc. Therefore a CPF includes instances in which the environment is
populated by agents the representation of which requires intensional logic, and indeed quantified
intensional logic.15
9.2 Unprecedented Expressivity
We have previously proved [e.g. in (Bringsjord & Govindarajulu, 2012)] that we cannot model even
everyday propositional knowledge in non-intensional systems.16 For the sort of problems we are
interested in, minimally, first-order logic, married to multiple intensional operators, is required. For
a simple instance of this point, consider that we need to have uncompromising representations of
statements such as:
1. “There is no one in the room who believes that no one is in the room.”
2. “The organizer believed that the number of people in the room (7) was more than what was allowed,
and hence had to ask some of the participants to leave.”
It is impossible to model these statements in systems that are not at once non-quantificational or
non-intensional in nature. Even prior art such as the event calculus and the systems in Wooldridge
(2002), which are sensitive to expressivity demands, are based on systems that are markedly less
expressive than the quantified multi-operator modal calculus we use in the present paper.17 Along
the same line, from the formal point of view, the excellent, aforementioned Pearce et al. (2014)
allows nested belief operators, but their scope does not include unrestricted quantification, rather
sub-formulae in zero-order logic; and the other intensional operators, epistemic and otherwise, are
absent. The false-belief task was provably solved by the logicist AI system specified and imple-
mente3d in Arkoudas & Bringsjord (2009a), and even infinitary cognitive challenges are met in
Arkoudas & Bringsjord (2004), but this work is essentially a proper subset and ancestor of the
richer formalism and technology brought to bear in our attack on CAISs.
9.3 Rejection of Fixed Logics
Our work is not based on a particular, standard logic, such as are brought to bear in the epistemic
case in the likes of (Moore, 1985) and (Fagin et al., 2004), or in work that directly appropriates a
15. In further contrast, CPF can include irreducibly visual entities the representation of which requires heterogeneous
logic Barwise & Etchemendy (1995); Arkoudas & Bringsjord (2009b), which none of the prior/related researchers in
the logicist tradition referred to in the present section ever investigated, since they worked/work on straight symbolic
systems, with no homomorphic representations to be found. Moreover, even in the case of non-mental objects,
arbitrary polysolids are allowed, and these solids can be in motion through time. The case studies discussed in the
present paper don’t employ the full available range of entities allowable in a CPF; and formal specification of CPF
and the broader category of cognitive microworlds is out of scope here.
16. The founders of modern AI, many of whom were logicits, all came to the field from mathematical logic, which is
by definition extensional, not intensional; see e.g. (Ebbinghaus et al., 1994) for discussion. The irony here is that
Leibniz can be viewed as the primogenitor of logicist AI, and he invented both modern extensional and intensional
formal logic.
17. For a more detailed discussion, please see the appendix in Govindarajulu & Bringsjord (2017a).
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logic-programming base and syntax, since such bases are invariably built atop extensional resolu-
tion. Indeed, it’s in part precisely because of the inadequacy of “off the shelf” logics [such as those
in the well-known ♦- ontology for modal/epistemic logics] that motivated the creation of cogni-
tive calculi in the first place. As seen above, cognitive calculi are a space of formal systems that
are composed of a typed signature Σ (which in turn include an alphabet, formal grammar, and type
information), along with a tailor-made, easily adjustable collection of inference schemata. Hence,
given cognitive calculus is unlikely to correspond to any fixed, rigid logic; moreoever, any use of
a informal syntax renders the work based upon this use radically different than our specification of
signatures. Almost all prior work in AI in the logicist tradition is based on off-the-shelf logics, with
standard, long-standing inference rules. In fact, the early, seminal work done in this tradition by
Newell, Simon, McCarthy, and Hayes was based on exploitation of the propositional and predicate
calculi. Our approach is dramatically different, in that any collection of natural (where ‘natural’
is a here a technical term, one used in e.g. ‘natural deduction) inference schemata can be created
and used, and immediately implemented via corresponding adjustments in ShadowProver. Note as
well that inference schemata can be, and often in our work are, meta-logical.18 This enables what
appears to be unprecedented flexibility.
9.4 Rejection of Standard Semantics/Models in Favor of Proof-Theoretic Semantics
Here is a telling quote from early work by Hayes:
The ability to interpret our axioms in a possible world, see what they say and whether it is
true or not, is so useful that I cannot imagine proceeding without it. . . . The main attraction of
formal logics as representational languages is that they have very precise model theories, and
the main attraction of first-order logic is that its model theory is so simple, so widely applicable,
and yet so powerful. (Hayes 1985, 10)
This quote is telling because our cognitive calculi are purely inference-theoretic, and are traceable in
this regard directly back to the advent of proof-theoretic semantics Prawitz (1972), which eschews
semantics of the sort that Hayes venerates. A cognitive calculus has no provided model theory for
its extensional levels, and rejects any use for instance of possible worlds to provide non-inferential
semantics for modal operators, a rejection that can be traced back to an early proof by Bringsjord
(1985) that standard set-theoretic unpackings of possible worlds lead to absurdity.
9.5 What About Bayesian Approaches?
We have of course placed the underlying technical content of our AI work on CAISs within the logi-
cist tradition.19 What about Bayesian approaches to reaching the goals we have for smart rooms and
in particular CAISs? How does such work relate technically to cognitive calculi and the reasoning
18. E.g., a schema might say that if φ is provable in less than k steps, then an agent should believe φ.
19. We have for economy herein gone “light” on the historical trajectory of this approach (which is easily traceable to
Leibniz, and even to Aristotle) to both modeling and mechanizing human-level cognition. For an overview of all
of AI, including from an historical point of view, and covering Bayesianism in the field as well, see Bringsjord &
Govindarajulu (2017). Dedicated coverage of the logicist approach in AI and computational cognitive science can be
found here: (Bringsjord, 2008b,a).
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and planning systems that work symbiotically with them (all covered, of course, above)? We do not
have space for a sustained answer to these questions, and therefore opt for stark brevity via but two
points: One, since Bayesian work in AI is of necessity based on underlying formal languages of the
extensional and simple sort (e.g., propositional and predicate calculi with the key function symbol
prob whose range is [0, 1]) used to specify at least parts of the probability calculus going back to
Kolmogorov, and since these formal languages are painfully inexpressive relative to cognitive cal-
culi, Bayesian formalisms and technology built atop them are inadequate for reaching the goals we
have set.20 Two: Bringsjord and Govindarajulu subsume probability into a proof-theoretic approach
based on multi-valued cognitive calculi, where the values are likelihood values, or — as they are
sometimes known — strength factors. For details, see (Govindarajulu & Bringsjord, 2017b).
9.6 Novelty?
While intelligent and immersive rooms have been designed and built by researchers for decades,
there has not been any formal, rigorous work characterizing an intelligent room and how it differs
from other AI-infused environments. We offer the first such characterization of an intelligent room
that has cognitive abilities: a CAIS powered by AI operating on the strength of cognitive calculi,
which are in turn empowered by implemented reasoning and planning technology, where specific
requirements must be met. We have also shown that a room that satisfies these requirements can
have a useful property that we term expectation of usefulness. One advantage of our formalization
is that we have used a quantified multi-operator modal logic that has been previously used to model
higher-level cognitive principles. This opens up possibilities for principled integration of other
cognitive abilities in the future.
10. Conclusion
We now quickly summarize our contributions and present promising future lines of work. Our
primary contribution is in the creation of an overseeing AI that is capable of tracking participants’
mental states as they operate within a CAIS. This AI is capable of using this information to reason
and plan assisting the participants in completing a task and tracking information as well as generate
explanations for its actions. As part of this system, we give a definition for a concrete framework that
can be used to generate future tests of increasing complexity for the system. We give the necessary
machinery via syntax and sorts to use this framework as well as show a base implementation that
was derived from the framework. Within this implementation, we show two tasks that can be solved
via the the overarching AI that encompasses a CAIS and has a sufficient definition of theory of
mind.
Future work will be on further empowering the overarching AI, in creating additional domains
of work, and to create an overarching formal definition for a cognitive and immersive framework. To
extend the AI framework, we are considering adding partial satisfaction planning capabilities (Van
Den Briel et al., 2004; Smith, 2004) to the Spectra planner so that it can reason about goals that
20. Even inductive logicians of the first rank readily acknowledge that the probability of such propositions as that Jones
believes that Smith believes that Jones believes that there are exactly two properties shared between Black and Smith
are inexpressible in Bayesianism; e.g. see (Fitelson, 2010).
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conflict with each other in a utility-centric framework. In addition, we currently allow agents to
add goal priority explicitly. However, in a real group discussion, priority of a given goal may shift
implicitly or by recognizing the particular belief states of the agents about a given goal. To improve
upon this, we aim to incorporate research of social choice theory and ranking data via such methods
as discussed in Xia (2017).
The cognitive and immersive framework would form the basis for any of our cognitive frame-
works, which includes the CPF. From the core cognitive definition of the CPF, we hope to expand
our system to other domains that would benefit from the cognitive capabilities demonstrated here.
For one such domain, the presented work can be very useful in business negotiation scenarios like
contracts management or using software where multiple parties are involved and can have different
vantage points (mental models) for discussion. There has been some work on analyzing contracts
for identifying gaps (Desai et al., 2008) and terms of conditions for software services (Vukovic
et al., 2014) but they do not consider parties’ mental models. Finally, we aim to further enhance and
refine the CPF such that it can be used to capture and reason about more complex domains than the
presented blocks world, such as described in Barker-Plummer et al. (2017); Johnson et al. (2016)
and how agents may interact with them.
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